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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal arises under the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (FDCPA or Act). The question presented is 
whether a collection letter sent to collect a time-barred debt that 
makes a “settlement offer” to accept payment “in settlement 
of” the debt could violate the Act’s general prohibition against 
“any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in 
connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 
We hold that it could. 
I 
 Over ten years ago, Appellant Michelle Tatis incurred a 
debt of $1,289.86 to Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. 
Appellee Allied Interstate, LLC—a debt collector—sent Tatis 
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a letter dated May 18, 2015 that read as follows: “[The creditor] 
is willing to accept payment in the amount of $128.99 in 
settlement of this debt. You can take advantage of this 
settlement offer if we receive payment of this amount or if you 
make another mutually acceptable payment arrangement 
within 40 days . . . .” App. 37. At the time Allied sent its letter, 
the six-year New Jersey statute of limitations applicable to 
debt-collection actions had already run. Tatis v. Allied 
Interstate, LLC, 2016 WL 5660431, at *1, *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 
2016); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1. 
 Tatis filed a class action in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging that Allied’s 
letter violated the FDCPA. The complaint alleged that Tatis 
interpreted the word “settlement” in the letter to mean that she 
had a “legal obligation” to pay the debt, and the least-
sophisticated debtor would hold a similar belief. Compl. ¶ 27, 
App. 32. She also claimed the letter was a “false, deceptive, or 
misleading representation or means in connection with” 
collecting the debt. Compl. ¶ 37, App. 34. Specifically, Tatis 
alleged that Allied “[f]alsely represent[ed] the legal status of 
the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A),” made “false 
threats to take action that cannot legally be taken in violation 
of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e and 1692e(5),” and used “false 
representations and/or deceptive means to collect or attempt to 
collect [the] debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10).” 
Compl. ¶ 38, App. 34. 
 Allied filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for 
failure to state a claim, and the District Court granted the 
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motion.1 See Tatis, 2016 WL 5660431, at *10. In doing so, the 
Court looked primarily to our decision in Huertas v. Galaxy 
Asset Management, 641 F.3d 28, 32–33 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam), which it read to hold that an attempt to collect a time-
barred debt does not violate the FDCPA unless it is 
accompanied by the threat of legal action. See Tatis, 2016 WL 
5660431, at *5. And because Allied’s use of the word 
“settlement” did not constitute threatened legal action, the 
Court found dismissal of the complaint appropriate. Id. at *8–
9. The Court also found it significant that, under New Jersey 
law, partial repayment of the debt would not revive the statute 
of limitations. Id. at *9. Thus, the letter could not deceive or 
mislead a consumer into inadvertently reviving a time-barred 
legal claim. Id.2 
 Tatis filed this appeal. 
                                              
1 Allied filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
but the District Court construed it as a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim because it was filed before the pleadings 
were closed. Tatis, 2016 WL 5660431, at *3. 
 2 Tatis also alleged that Allied used “unfair or 
unconscionable means” when attempting to collect the debt. 
The District Court dismissed that count, Tatis, 2016 WL 
5660431, at *9, and Tatis has not made an argument 
challenging that ruling on appeal, Tatis Br. 4–5. See Linder & 
Assocs., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 F.3d 547, 552 n.5 
(3d Cir. 1999). 
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II3 
A 
 We review de novo the District Court’s order 
dismissing Tatis’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Wilson v. 
Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 353 (3d Cir. 2000). “[W]e 
accept as true all allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as well 
as all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, and 
we construe them in a light most favorable to the non-movant.” 
Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d 
Cir. 2010). To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007)). Plausibility means “more than a sheer 
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “A claim 
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 
B 
 Congress enacted the FDCPA to curb “abusive, 
deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692(a). Among other things, the Act seeks “to eliminate 
abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors [and] to 
insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive 
debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.” 
Id. § 1692(e). To effectuate these purposes, Congress 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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proscribed the use of “any false, deceptive, or misleading 
representation or means in connection with the collection of 
any debt” and provided a list of sixteen examples of such 
prohibited conduct. Id. § 1692e. These include making “false 
representation[s]” about “the character, amount, or legal status 
of any debt,” id. § 1692e(2)(A), and “threat[ening] to take any 
action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be 
taken,” id. § 1692e(5). As we have noted, “[b]ecause the list of 
the sixteen subsections is non-exhaustive, a debt collection 
practice can be a ‘false, deceptive, or misleading’ practice in 
violation of section 1692e even if it does not fall within any of 
the subsections.” Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 
650 F.3d 993, 997 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 The FDCPA is remedial, so we “construe its language 
broadly, so as to effect its purpose.” Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 
464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006). In addition, we employ a 
“least sophisticated debtor” standard to evaluate whether a 
particular debt-collection practice violates the Act. Jensen v. 
Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing 
Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
This standard aims to “protect[] the gullible as well as the 
shrewd,” id. (alteration in original) (quoting Campuzano-
Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 550 F.3d 294, 298 (3d 
Cir. 2008)), but it nevertheless “preserv[es] a quotient of 
reasonableness and presum[es] a basic level of understanding 
and willingness to read with care,” id. (alterations in original) 
(quoting Rosenau, 539 F.3d at 221); see also Lesher, 650 F.3d 
at 997 (characterizing the least-sophisticated debtor standard 
as a “low standard”). The standard is objective, “meaning that 
the specific plaintiff need not prove that she was actually 
confused or misled, only that the objective least sophisticated 
debtor would be.” Jensen, 791 F.3d at 419. 
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C 
 To prevail on her FDCPA claim, Tatis must 
demonstrate that “(1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a 
debt collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves 
an attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the Act defines it, and (4) the 
defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting 
to collect the debt.” Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 
F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2014). Only the fourth element is 
disputed in this appeal. 
 In arguing whether Allied violated the FDCPA, the 
parties offer competing interpretations of our opinion in 
Huertas. Allied contends that Huertas imposed a “threat of 
litigation” requirement that must be present for an attempt to 
collect a time-barred debt to violate the FDCPA. By contrast, 
Tatis attempts to distinguish Huertas, arguing that an “offer to 
settle may mislead the least sophisticated [debtor] into 
believing that a time-barred debt is legally enforceable, even 
when litigation is not threatened.” Tatis, 2016 WL 5660431, at 
*2.  
 In Huertas, the plaintiff received a letter seeking to 
collect a time-barred debt. 641 F.3d at 31. Suit was brought 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A), alleging that the collection 
letter Huertas received falsely represented the legal status of 
his debt which, like Tatis’s, was time-barred under New Jersey 
law. Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 2010 WL 936450, at *4 
(D.N.J. Mar. 9, 2010); see also Huertas, 641 F.3d at 32. We 
disagreed for several reasons.  
First, we explained that Huertas’s debt remained valid 
under New Jersey law even after the statute of limitations had 
run. Huertas, 641 F.3d at 32. But even though the debt was still 
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owed, Huertas “ha[d] a complete legal defense against having 
to pay it.” Id. Next, we explained that “when the expiration of 
the statute of limitations does not invalidate a debt, but merely 
renders it unenforceable, the FDCPA permits a debt collector 
to seek voluntary repayment of the time-barred debt so long as 
the debt collector does not initiate or threaten legal action in 
connection with its debt collection efforts.” See id. at 32–33. In 
reaching this conclusion, we cited with approval the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision in Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Services, 
Inc., 248 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 2001). Consistent with 
Freyermuth, “Huertas’s FDCPA claim hinge[d] on whether 
[the collection] letter threatened litigation,” as “analyzed from 
the perspective of the ‘least sophisticated debtor.’” Huertas, 
641 F.3d at 33 (quoting Brown, 464 F.3d at 453). We 
concluded that the letter—which informed Huertas that his 
debt had been reassigned and requested that he contact the 
agency to “resolve this issue”—contained no such 
impermissible threat. Id. 
 Thus, Huertas stands for the proposition that debt 
collectors do not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) when they 
seek voluntary repayment of stale debts, so long as they do not 
threaten or take legal action. But the FDCPA sweeps far more 
broadly than the specific provision found in § 1692e(2)(A). It 
prohibits “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation” 
associated with debt-collection practices. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e 
(emphasis added). Accordingly, this appeal requires us to 
decide whether collection letters may run afoul of the FDCPA 
by misleading or deceiving debtors into believing they have a 
legal obligation to repay time-barred debts even when the 
letters do not threaten legal action. 
D 
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 Since Huertas, three other United States Courts of 
Appeals have addressed the question presented in this appeal. 
All three have determined that, even absent threats of litigation, 
it is plausible that offers to “settle” time-barred debts could 
mislead the least-sophisticated debtor.  
The first of the three decisions is McMahon v. LVNV 
Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2014). In McMahon, 
the Seventh Circuit held that an offer to settle a time-barred 
debt may violate the FDCPA if it “uses language . . . that would 
mislead an unsophisticated consumer into believing that the 
debt is legally enforceable.” Id. at 1020. In particular, the court 
observed that “a settlement offer on a timebarred debt implies 
that the creditor could successfully sue on the debt.” Id. at 
1022; see also id. at 1021 (“If a consumer received an ‘offer 
for settlement’ and searched on Google to see what is meant by 
‘settlement,’ she might find the Wikipedia entry for ‘settlement 
offer,’” which includes a discussion of civil lawsuits). 
Accordingly, “[i]f unsophisticated consumers believe either 
that the settlement offer is their chance to avoid court 
proceedings where they would be defenseless, or if they 
believe that the debt is legally enforceable at all, they have been 
misled, and the debt collector has violated the FDCPA.” Id. at 
1022. The McMahon court also stated that the Act “cannot 
bear” any reading requiring a threat of litigation, noting that 
“[t]he plain language of the FDCPA prohibits not only 
threatening to take actions that the collector cannot take, but 
also the use of any false, deceptive, or misleading 
representation.” Id. at 1020–21. 
 A year after McMahon, the Sixth Circuit in Buchanan 
v. Northland Group, Inc. held that a settlement offer could 
“plausibly mislead an unsophisticated consumer into thinking 
her lender could enforce the debt in court.” 776 F.3d 393, 395 
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(6th Cir. 2015). The court supported this conclusion by looking 
to definitions of the terms “settle,” “settlement,” and 
“settlement agreement” in six formal and informal dictionaries. 
Id. at 399 (providing direct quotations from Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary, The Oxford English Dictionary 
Online, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language, Wiktionary, Dictionary.com, and Black’s Law 
Dictionary). Though each source provided numerous 
definitions, they all included one that referred to the conclusion 
and/or the avoidance of a lawsuit. Id. And like McMahon, the 
Buchanan court observed that “the addition of the term 
‘misleading’ confirms[ that] the statute outlaws more than just 
falsehoods[,] . . . [such that] even a true statement may be 
banned for creating a misleading impression.” Id. at 396 
(citation omitted). After Buchanan, the Fifth Circuit joined the 
chorus, endorsing the same view expressed by the Sixth and 
Seventh Circuits. Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 
836 F.3d 507, 513 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 Although we are not bound by these precedents of our 
sister courts, we are persuaded that their considered view is the 
best interpretation of the FDCPA. As the Seventh Circuit noted 
in McMahon, construing the Act to require a threat of legal 
action for any FDCPA violation interposes a mandate that is 
not found in its text. 744 F.3d at 1020–21. Section 1692e 
prohibits three discrete categories of conduct: false, 
misleading, or deceptive representations. So adding a “threat 
of litigation” requirement to all time-barred debt-collection 
efforts curtails the reach of the Act by excising conduct 
otherwise covered by the terms “deceptive” or “misleading.” 
Common sense, our case law, and traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation foreclose such a construction.  
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For example, “in certain contexts[,] a completely 
accurate statement can be deceptive or misleading.” 
Campuzano-Burgos, 550 F.3d at 301; see also Buchanan, 776 
F.3d at 396 (noting that the term “misleading” bans “more than 
just falsehoods”). Moreover, a communication subject to the 
FDCPA is deceptive if “it can be reasonably read to have two 
or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate.” Id. at 
298 (quoting Rosenau, 539 F.3d at 222). Thus, conduct by a 
debt collector can be unlawfully misleading or deceptive while 
still falling short of an explicit threat of litigation. Since our 
task is “to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of 
a statute,” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) 
(quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 
(1955)), we decline Allied’s invitation to construe the FDCPA 
in a manner that narrows the broad language Congress enacted. 
See Brown, 464 F.3d at 453 (noting that we “construe [the 
FDCPA’s] language broadly, so as to effect its purpose”); see 
also Disabled in Action v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 
210 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting the Court “assume[s] . . . that every 
word in a statute has meaning and avoid[s] interpreting one part 
of a statute in a manner that renders another part superfluous”). 
 We also agree with our sister courts that, in the specific 
context of a debt-collection letter, the least-sophisticated 
debtor could be misled into thinking that “settlement of the 
debt” referred to the creditor’s ability to enforce the debt in 
court rather than a mere invitation to settle the account. App. 
37. See Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 395; McMahon, 744 F.3d at 
1021. As the Buchanan court’s survey of sources suggests, 
multiple dictionaries define “settle” to refer not only to 
“settling accounts,” but also to the avoidance or resolution of 
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litigation.4 See 776 F.3d at 399. Moreover, the chance that the 
letter could mislead the least-sophisticated debtor increases 
with the use of phrases such as “settlement offer,” which 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines as “[a]n offer by one party to 
settle a dispute amicably (usu[ally] by paying money) to avoid 
or end a lawsuit or other legal action.” (10th ed. 2014). 
 These textual sources and the reasoning of the Fifth, 
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits indicate that Tatis has “state[d] a 
facially plausible claim for relief.” Caprio v. Healthcare 
Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 
2013). Because the words “settlement” and “settlement offer” 
could connote litigation, the least-sophisticated debtor could be 
                                              
4 Our own survey confirms this point. Settle, CONCISE 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH (7th ed. 1982) 
(“[T]erminate (lawsuit) by mutual agreement.”); Settle, 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000) (“To decide (a lawsuit) by mutual 
agreement of the involved parties without court action.”; “To 
come to an agreement, especially to resolve a lawsuit out of 
court.”); Settle, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (3d 
ed. 1993) (“[T]o conclude (a lawsuit) by agreement between 
the parties usu. out of court.”); see also Settlement, AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 
2000) (“An arrangement, adjustment, or other understanding 
reached, as in financial or business proceedings: a divorce 
settlement.”); Settlement, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
UNABRIDGED (3d ed. 1993) (“[P]ayment or adjustment of an 
account: satisfaction of a claim by agreement often with less 
than full payment.”). 
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misled into thinking Allied could legally enforce the debt. Cf., 
e.g., Huertas, 641 F.3d at 33 (analyzing a letter using the more 
general verb “to resolve”). We recognize that some debtors 
might properly interpret Allied’s letter as referring solely to the 
settlement of an account. See Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 400–01 
(Kethledge, J., dissenting) (noting that many debtors receive 
multiple collection letters without a suit ever being brought). 
But others may not. See Wilson, 225 F.3d at 354 (noting that 
the “least sophisticated debtor” standard is lower than the 
“reasonable debtor” standard). Both the context in which the 
letter is received and the available textual sources indicate that, 
far from being a “bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretation[]” not 
covered by the least-sophisticated debtor standard, interpreting 
the settlement offer as creating a legally-enforceable obligation 
is a mistake even a debtor “willing[] to read with care” might 
make. Campuzano-Burgos, 550 F.3d at 299 (quoting Rosenau, 
539 F.3d at 221). 
 In sum, because we conclude that the least-sophisticated 
debtor could plausibly be misled by the specific language used 
in Allied’s letter, we will vacate the District Court’s order 
granting Allied’s motion to dismiss and remand for further 
proceedings. In doing so, we reiterate what we said both in 
Huertas and elsewhere: standing alone, settlement offers and 
attempts to obtain voluntary repayments of stale debts do not 
necessarily constitute deceptive or misleading practices. See 
Huertas, 641 F.3d at 32–33; see also Campuzano-Burgos, 550 
F.3d at 299 (noting that “[t]here is nothing improper about 
making a settlement offer”). Nor do we impose any specific 
mandates on the language debt collectors must use, such as 
requiring them to explicitly disclose that the statute of 
limitations has run. We do not, therefore, hold that the use of 
the word “settlement” is “misleading as a matter of federal 
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law.” Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 400 (Kethledge, J., dissenting). 
Rather, in keeping with the text and purpose of the FDCPA, we 
merely reiterate that any such letters, when read in their 
entirety, must not deceive or mislead the least-sophisticated 
debtor into believing that she has a legal obligation to pay the 
time-barred debt. See, e.g., Caprio, 709 F.3d at 149 (noting that 
“even the ‘least sophisticated debtor’ is expected to read any 
notice in its entirety”); Huertas, 641 F.3d at 33 (examining the 
specific language used in the letter from the perspective of the 
least-sophisticated debtor); Campuzano-Burgos, 550 F.3d at 
300 (analyzing letters “as a whole”). 
III 
 For the reasons stated, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order granting Allied’s motion to dismiss and remand 
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
